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EC, that now accorded primacy is the ensuring of 'a fair standard of living for the agricultural community'. It may also be suggested that 'Mid-term Review' is something of a misnomer, in that the measures that it introduced proved more wide-ranging than the measures introduced by Agenda 2000 itself. The reform process remains ongoing. While the Mid-term * Senior Lecturer in Law, School of Law, University of Leeds. ** Professor of Law, Newcastle Law School, University of Newcastle. We are grateful to Ilona Cheyne and Peggy Grossman for comments on an earlier draft of this article. The usual disclaimers apply. 1 It was envisaged that the main effect of the Mid-term Review would be upon the milk quota system (on the basis that a decision would be taken to end milk quotas by 2006 ). Yet, in the event, the milk quota system was one of the few areas of the Common Agricultural Policy that remained relatively undisturbed (milk quotas surviving until at least 31 
II. PRESSURES FOR REFORM AND THE WTO
At the commencement of Agenda 2000, internal pressures were in themselves felt sufficient to justify change. Three factors, in particular, were highlighted. These were the need to improve competitiveness, the need to make the Common Agricultural Policy more acceptable to the citizen in the street and to the consumer, and the need to decentralise without giving rise to distortion of competition or renationalisation of the Common Agricultural Policy.
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The Mid-term Review identified similar internal challenges, emphasising the need to secure 'a fair standard of living and income stability for the agricultural community'. Such support would be justified 'through the provision of services that the public expects farmers to provide'. 13 In this may be detected a new 'bargain' between farmers and society. The necessity for support was not questioned, but the nature of the support would be recast so as to meet the demands of the taxpayers who provided it. In the words of Commissioner Fischler, ' [o]ur proposal DOES NOT mean abandoning the CAP as some claim or fear. We are firmly committed to support also agriculture in the future'. Rather, '[w] hat it DOES mean is that we want to support our farmers differently': the 'political reality' was that continued acceptance by the European taxpayer of the need for a Common Agricultural Policy depended on subsidies producing value for money for the taxpayer.
14 That said, from the commencement of the reform process two external factors were clearly acknowledged: the prospect of Eastward enlargement; and the (then) forthcoming WTO negotiations. 15 In the case of the WTO negotiations there were, besides, specific time constraints, because agriculture enjoyed its own 'stand-alone' schedule, not dependent upon removing all trade distorting agricultural subsidies over a ten year period). Indeed, many commentators have considered the stance of the Community in the Uruguay Round to be primarily reactive in nature. 16 By contrast, the Agenda 2000 reforms were understood from the outset to stake out the position that would be defended in what would become the Doha Round. In 1999 Commissioner Fischler stated that 'we need from the very beginning to adopt a clear and realistic position with which to enter the negotiations. This we hope to achieve While the pressure to meet WTO requirements would appear to have been consistent, its translation into specific legislative measures within the Community legal order would appear to have been more incremental. This was expressly recognised at the time of the Midterm Review, where the Common Agricultural Policy was described as 'an evolving policy'.
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In consequence, as shall be seen, a significantly different impact on world trade has been claimed by the Community for, on the one hand, the reforms agreed at the Berlin Summit and, on the other, their subsequent Mid-term Review.
Before considering these reform packages in greater depth, two preliminary points should be noted. First, although the specific legislative measures would appear to have been evolutionary, the Community institutions have throughout maintained that the overarching, and stable, objective has been to give 'concrete form' to a European Model of Agriculture.
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The multifunctional model of European agriculture embraces both food and non-food outputs, the latter including the protection of the environment, food safety, animal welfare and cultural heritage (these non-food outputs being often characterised as 'public goods', 'externalities' or even 'spillovers'). The legitimacy of the multifunctional model has for some time been questioned. Not least, it has been suggested that many of the public goods delivered by agricultural production could be achieved more efficiently if divorced from such production.
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This debate has been continued in the Doha Round, where non-food outputs have been associated with 'non-trade concerns' and the focus of the debate has been on the extent to which it is legitimate to provide for their support. In the words of the OECD, '[u]nderlying the debate on multifunctionality are some of the same considerations as the discussion of "non-trade" concerns that has evolved in the context of multilateral trade negotiations'.
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These issues will be addressed more fully below.
The ongoing implementation of a multifunctional European Model of Agriculture was also re-affirmed at the time of the Mid-term Review. Even as the Common Agricultural decoupling implicit in the URAA is in line with the definition of an effectively decoupled package: in other words, a package whose introduction does not increase the level of production. Accordingly, while farmers may decide to alter their cropping patterns, this would occur 'in a way that does not result in larger production' (although the response of supply to an external shock could be different).
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Six aspects of the SFP will be highlighted here, all of which have significant WTO implications. First, although broad in scope, the SFP is not exhaustive. It has extended ab initio to all products included in the arable crops regime, grain legumes, seeds, beef and sheep. 50 Moreover, Member States may opt to implement the SFP on a regional as opposed to an individual basis; 51 and in these circumstances it may also include ab initio the dairy premium and additional payments. 52 Further, following reform of the sugar sector, as from 1 January 2006 compensation payments for price cuts in that sector form a yet further element of the SFP. 53 It is significant, however, that over and above the SFP there remain targeted aid schemes, such as the specific quality premium for durum wheat and the protein crop premium. 54 There would seem to be no question that these targeted aid schemes are coupled to a particular form of production. Cotton. 62 As a general rule, SFP payment entitlements can only be unlocked by 'matching' them against eligible land owned or occupied by the producer. In other words, a producer must be able to show that he owns or occupies a hectare of eligible land for each SFP payment entitlement in respect of which a claim is made. 63 However, it is expressly provided that land under, inter alia, fruit, vegetables and potatoes may not sustain a claim for the SFP (except, in the case of potatoes, where intended for the manufacture of potato starch). 64 The rationale behind the measure was that fruit, vegetables and potatoes had in the past been largely unsupported; and, in the absence of such an exclusion, there was a danger that farmers entitled to the SFP would move into these sectors bolstered by the competitive advantage that it conferred. The net result, nonetheless, is that the SFP may on this account fall short of full production neutrality, channelling support into those agricultural sectors that have previously further, that compulsory long-term set-aside be introduced on arable land for 10 years. 67 In the event, however, the rotational model has been retained, in a complex settlement under which set-aside entitlements are allocated and managed as a separate branch of the SFP scheme. Each producer has been allocated set-aside entitlements calculated in principle by reference to the average number of acres compulsorily set aside over 2000-2002. However, the United Kingdom has opted to apply a regionalised method for calculating the set-aside rate, as allowed for in the Community legislation. 68 In consequence, it has been fixed at 8 per cent for lowland England, 1.3 per cent for severely disadvantaged areas and 0 per cent for moorland. 69 Land which is set aside cannot as a rule be used for agricultural purposes or for the production of a commercial crop, but must be maintained in good agricultural and environmental condition. 70 Payment of set-aside entitlements is unlocked where a producer can match set-aside entitlements against eligible land, as under the SFP scheme generally.
Sixthly, the multifunctional role of agriculture has been recognised by the imposition of cross-compliance conditions upon receipt of both the SFP and other direct payments.
Farmers are obliged to observe a range of Community statutory management requirements in the areas of: public, animal and plant health; the environment; and animal welfare. 71 They must also maintain all agricultural land in 'good agricultural and environmental condition', minimum requirements for which are to be defined at national or regional level by the 69 The calculations are labyrinthine. The set-aside rate is less than the original 10 per cent applied from 2000 because the new scheme covers a larger area of each holding: instead of just applying to arable land the set aside scheme now applies to land used for all purposes other than permanent pasture (it could include, for instance fodder crops and temporary grass). The percentage of the total eligible area of a holding to which the set-aside rate applies is, therefore, greater. The intention is to arrive at a similar area of arable land set aside in any one year, defined on a regional basis, by scaling down the total set-aside requirement proportionately. 70 Horizontal Regulation provides for reduction or exclusion from payments in the event of noncompliance and, in so doing, provides a sanction over and above any sanctions in the various Directives and Regulations which form the basis of those cross-compliance requirements.
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Where non-compliance is intentional, the percentage of reduction is not in principle to be less than 20 per cent; and, as the most draconian sanction, it is possible to exclude a farmer from 
B. The Single Farm Payment as Decoupled Income Support
The rules governing 'green box' exemption from domestic support reduction commitments are currently contained in Annex 2 to the URAA. To qualify for exemption, domestic support must satisfy two criteria. First, it must satisfy the 'fundamental requirement', set out in Similarly, the URAA supplies no guidance for determining whether the effect of support is in fact to provide price support to producers. This question will be revisited below, as it is common to several of the key 'green box' criteria, as currently framed.
Of the specific conditions to be met in addition to the fundamental requirement set out in Paragraph 1, those governing schemes that provide direct payments to producers are of central importance to the 'green box' compatibility of the SFP. The detailed rules are contained in Paragraphs 5-13 of Annex 2 to the URAA. Paragraph 6 governs decoupled income support and is of greatest relevance in this context. It provides as follows:
'(a) Eligibility for such payments shall be determined by clearly-defined criteria such as income, status as a producer or landowner, factor use or production level in a defined and fixed base period.
(b) The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, the type or volume of production (including livestock units) undertaken by the producer in any year after the base period. (c) The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, the prices, domestic or international, applying to any production undertaken in any year after the base period.
(d) The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, the factors of production employed in any year after the base period.
(e) No production shall be required in order to receive such payments.'
These detailed rules raise a number of issues. argued that continued updating of reference periods in respect of the existing decoupled support created an expectation that production of certain crops would reap payment benefits.
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The Panel did not consider it necessary to decide the issue; but it did observe that the direct payments regime was a 'successor' programme to the production flexibility contracts regime, albeit with differences. Also, it felt there was no evidence, 'only speculation', as to whether 98 See, e.g., A Swinbank and R Tranter, 'Decoupling EU that requires the recipient to engage in the production of no crops at all, since the provision only prohibits the amount of payments being related to, or based on, the type or volume of production in any year after the base period. Accordingly, in the view of the Panel, the prohibition would not cover those required to undertake no production at all.
105
On this point, the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel. It decided that, by prohibiting Members from making 'green box' measures contingent on continued production, the URAA implied that Members were 'allowed, in principle, to require no production at all'.
The Appellate Body also addressed Paragraph 6(b) and the argument that making payments contingent on a total ban on production could be seen as a way of relating the amount of payment to the volume of production (the volume of production in this case being nil). This argument was felt to be inconsistent with the combined meaning and effect of Paragraphs 6(b)
and (e), so favouring an interpretation of Paragraph 6(b) that permitted a total ban of production.
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With specific reference to the SFP scheme, however, a different problem may be encountered in that, although there is no requirement to continue production in order to receive support payments, the cross-compliance conditions may themselves indirectly require a minimum level of production. In particular, farmers are obliged to maintain all agricultural land in good agricultural and environmental condition; 107 and, according to the Community standards set out in the 2003 Horizontal Regulation, this may involve, for example, the maintenance of 'minimum livestock stocking rates and/or appropriate regimes'. 108 There must be an argument that this language requires some level of production in contravention of Paragraph 6(e).
Further difficulty may arise from the fact that Paragraph 6(d) requires that 'the amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, the factors of production employed in any year after the base period'. It has, for instance, been argued that this criterion may be contravened by the obligation in the Community legal order to 'match' SFP payment entitlements to eligible land in order to unlock payments. In the case of production flexibility contracts, however, planting flexibility was constrained by a specific provision reducing or eliminating payments if, subject to exceptions, fruit and vegetables (other than lentils, mung beans and dry peas) were planted on upland cotton base areas. The same constraints applied in the case of direct payments, subject to the important addition of wild rice to the list of crops covered by the planting flexibility limitations. The
Appellate Body, agreeing with the Panel, took the view that this 'partial exclusion of some crops from payments has the potential to channel production towards the production of crops that remain eligible for payments. In contrast to a total production ban, the channelling of production that may follow from a partial exclusion of some crops from payments will have positive production effects as regards crops eligible for payments'. 110 It therefore rendered the schemes in breach of URAA obligations.
With regard to the SFP, the chief threat to its 'green box' compatibility on these grounds is the provision that prevents farmers sustaining a claim for the SFP on land under, inter alia, fruit, vegetables and potatoes (except, in the case of potatoes, where they are intended for the manufacture of potato starch). 111 As indicated, it could be contended that the effect is to channel support into sectors not subject to this exclusion. It must be remembered,
however, that where a Member State opts to allocate the SFP on a regional basis, the exclusion may not apply, with the result that 'green box' compatibility may be preserved.
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C. Non-trade Concerns
In the case of the SFP and other direct payments, the cross-compliance obligations imposed 
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That said, it may be argued that set-aside payments qualify as 'structural adjustment assistance' provided through resource retirement programmes, under Paragraph 10 of Annex 2 to the URAA. Because, however, the ability for farmers to set aside land on a rotational basis has survived the Mid-term Review, these provisions are open to the objection that they constitute primarily a supply-side market management tool, as opposed to 'structural adjustment assistance' of the kind envisaged by the 'green box' criteria. Indeed, the objective of controlling production was made explicit when set aside was first introduced by Council
Regulation 1094/88. 114 It should also be noted that the Mid-term Review requires farmers to maintain land set aside in good agricultural and environmental condition, ready to resume production should the need arise, a requirement that is of questionable compatibility with the concept of 'structural adjustment assistance'.
Turning to the more targeted financial support provided under the Rural Development Regulation, the most important category of 'green box' exemption is arguably that covering 'payments under environmental programmes'. 115 Under this category, as indicated, eligibility for payments must be determined as part of a clearly-defined government environmental or conservation programme. It must also be dependent on the fulfilment of specific conditions, 'including conditions related to production methods or inputs', while the amount of payments compatibility could be also applied to the Environmentally Sensitive Areas programme in England. 121 Like the Environmental Stewardship Scheme, there is more than one 'tier' of participation, including a basic 'tier' which offers payments for minimal changes in land use practice; and again there are both environmental and socio-economic objectives.
Against this background, the EC Comprehensive Negotiating Proposal, submitted to the WTO in 2000, accepted that the criteria for environmental schemes must be well targeted, transparent and implemented in a way which is not more than minimally trade-distorting; 122 but there was no attempt to address the substantive issue, namely, what is meant by 'environmental' protection in the context of the farmed environment? That said, it must be conceded that to determine the scope and objectives of agri-environmental schemes which will potentially qualify for 'green box' exemption could prove complex, given the close interrelationship between farming and the environment. As with maintaining land in good agricultural and environmental condition, many environmental concerns can only be met through continued farming, albeit using farming practices adapted to give a particular environmental benefit. Examples would be the adoption of extensive grazing regimes aimed at re-creating moorland habitats or arable-cropping patterns targeted at protecting groundnesting birds.
It is clear that the position adopted by the Community is based on the multifunctional premise that agri-environmental schemes produce joint products: agricultural produce and environmental services (i.e. public goods). Indeed, the Community has already shown some sensitivity to the potentially trade-distorting effects of such schemes where they also allow continued farm production. funded under environmental schemes should be withdrawn from the market as wasteful and cost inefficient. However, it accepted that the joint production of marketable products and environmental services should not be used to conceal distortive economic subsidies. 123 The discussion paper put forward the proposal, therefore, that where society requires farmers to deliver public goods in pursuit of a 'legitimate environmental or cultural objective', then governments should only recompense farmers for their additional costs and income foregone, taking account of the income they derive from selling commodities on the market.
This approach poses several questions, however. Which environmental objectives may be categorised as 'legitimate' for these purposes? For example, is it proposed that 'green box' exemption will cover both schemes promoting farmland biodiversity and schemes for the improvement of landscape values? Additionally, the stated negotiating position of the
Community ignores the fact that the Rural Development Regulation itself permits Member
States to take account not only of income foregone and additional costs when devising payment regimes for agri-environmental schemes, but also the 'need to provide an incentive'. 124 Under the Community legal order for rural development, payments must be determined on the basis of objective criteria; and a ceiling does limit the incentive element to a maximum of 20 per cent of the income foregone and the additional cost of carrying out the commitments. 125 The provision of incentive payments clearly has the potential to be tradedistorting. It may, therefore, be no coincidence that the recent proposal for a new Council
Regulation on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, which will replace the Rural Development Regulation, limits payments to additional costs and income foregone as a result of the commitment given, plus, where necessary, the option of covering transaction costs. Paragraph 2(f) of Annex 2 of the URAA refers to 'marketing and promotion services, including market information, advice and promotion relating to particular products'.
However, no measures granted green box exemption under Paragraph 2 may involve direct payments to producers or processors.
For the time being, the 2004 Framework Document commits WTO Members to the retention of the 'green box' in principle. But it also identifies its review and clarification as a priority 'with a view to ensuring that Green Box measures have no or at most minimal trade distorting effects or effects on production'. 130 Similarly the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration saw agreement that the 'green box' criteria should be revisited, 'inter alia, to ensure that programmes of developing country Members that cause not more than minimal trade-distortion are effectively covered'. 131 There would seem to be agreement in principle that non-trade concerns should be granted exemption from domestic support reduction commitments; but there would also seem to be recognition that the rules, as currently drafted, lack clarity and are arguably non-justiciable. 132 The extent to which the 'green box' should be reviewed is already a matter of some dispute, with some Members seeking to widen or narrow its terms substantially, while other Members see the purpose of the exercise as rather the refinement and reform of the existing arrangements in order to give them greater clarity and efficacy. 133 Any widening or narrowing of the 'green box' will be largely a matter for political discussion and agreement. On the other hand, whether or not the 'green box' is widened or narrowed in scope, the refinement of its qualifying criteria to give them greater clarity and effectiveness is primarily a matter for legal discourse. What can be said with some certainty is that if the URAA is to become an effective vehicle for the settlement of agricultural trade disputes, then its terms must be defined with much greater precision.
D. Quantification
An underlying principle of the URAA was to increase transparency. quantification of trade impacts, which will be examined here with regard to both decoupled income support and agri-environmental payments.
In the case of decoupled income support, most economists agree that fixed payments tied to a variable, such as past production in a reference period, is not production-neutral. 134 Both the SFP and the direct payments regime in the United States would in principle seem to fall within this category. The payment performs an income substitution function, substituting a fixed income for a variable and uncertain profit. This can have a variety of behavioural effects on the enterprise. In the case of a farmer facing debt constraints, for example, the provision of a guaranteed and fixed annual income will facilitate forward financial planning and increase the range of available production decisions based on profit maximisation. The application of sophisticated economic behavioural models has also demonstrated that an increase in production will be generated even in cases where no debt constraint is present.
Not least, such direct payments reduce the degree of risk experienced by the farmer. 135 Significantly, in the only decision in which the Community has been held to be in violation of its commitments under the URAA, European Communities -Export Subsidies on Sugar, the Appellate Body displayed a willingness to place considerable weight on the economic effects of payment regimes under the Common Agricultural Policy rather than their strict legal form. 136 The focus of European Communities -Export Subsidies on Sugar was not directly upon domestic support, but rather the alleged payment of export subsidies on sugar production in violation of commitments under Article 9.1 (c) of the URAA.
Nonetheless, several aspects of the decision have resonance with the issues which are being considered. Under the common organisation of the market in sugar, growers of sugar beet received domestic support in the form of intervention, basic and minimum prices for sugar produced within their 'A' and 'B' quotas. This domestic support secured prices which could be three times higher than those obtaining on the world market. Sugar produced in excess of the A and B quotas (known as 'C' sugar) was not to be sold within the Community in the year in which it was produced. 137 The overall effect of these provisions was that export of C sugar over the period 1997-2002 amounted to between 1.3 and 3.3 million tonnes annually at prices that did not 'even remotely' cover the average total cost of production.
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Two aspects of the ruling in European Communities -Export Subsidies on Sugar are important in the present context. First, as indicated, it was held that the Community regime involved a 'payment on the export of an agricultural product …financed by virtue of governmental action' within the meaning of Article 9.1 (c) of the URAA. 139 There was a 'tight nexus' between the mechanism by which the payments were financed and governmental action. 140 In the view of the Appellate Body, without the highly remunerative prices guaranteed for A and B beet, sales of C beet could not take place profitably at a price below the total cost of production. 141 Secondly, there was a transfer of resources in that C sugar producers were able to use the profits made on the sale of A and B sugar to crosssubsidise the export of C sugar at prices lower than the cost of production. Crosssubsidisation in this manner constituted an export subsidy within the meaning of the URAA. 142 In coming to this conclusion both the Panel and the Appellate Body used the average total cost of production as a benchmark to evaluate whether there was, in fact, a 'payment' in the sense of a real transfer of resources from A and B sugar production to C sugar production destined for export.
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The Appellate Body's reasoning emphasises the linkage between domestic support and export subsidies. Its willingness to go behind the 'formalistic' 144 structures of the common organisation of the market, and to look instead at the economic realities of production and export costs, could also have major implications for any assessment of the potentially tradedistorting effects of the SFP. As noted above, it is generally accepted that the payment of direct income support is not production-neutral and that (at the very least) it supplies an income substitution function for agricultural producers. In European Communities -Export Subsidies on Sugar, the Appellate Body was at pains to emphasise that its interpretation of the Community sugar regime did not erode the boundary between domestic support and export subsidies. 145 In particular, there was an obligation to export C sugar with the result that the export was not an incidental effect of the domestic support system, but rather a direct consequence of the Community sugar regime. 146 There may, indeed, be no obligation on producers to export in the case of the SFP. Nevertheless, in terms of their economic effect, there are obvious, if not exact, analogies between domestic support in the case of the SFP and under the Community sugar regime that was found to infringe WTO disciplines in European Communities -Export Subsidies on Sugar.
Aside from any question of cross-subsidisation, the key issue in relation to the SFP and domestic support is not whether decoupled income support is trade-distorting (it is generally accepted that it is), but whether it is minimally so. This raises the further issue as to how can its distorting effects be quantified. In order to apply the fundamental requirement for 'green box' exemption correctly in this context would require a complex measurement of the economic effects of the support in question. Yet the URAA gives no indication as to how this measurement is to be carried out, the criteria to be applied or the benchmarks against which it 143 Ibid,, para 267. 144 Ibid., para 265: '[t]he European Communities' approach is, in our view, too formalistic'. 145 Ibid., para.279. 146 Ibid., paras 280 and 282.
is to be done. It may also be ventured that, if the support is genuinely to target deficiencies in income, then the income of the producer (or lack thereof) should form a key criterion within any calculation of the level of support. This is demonstrably not the case with either the SFP or the direct payments regime in the United States. However, it must also be recognised that any attempt for these purposes to determine the income of producers would be fraught with Against this background, the importance of developing a more effective monitoring mechanism cannot be stressed too strongly. 153 It remains to be seen, however, whether a sufficiently transparent and robust system can be developed to inspire the confidence of the broader membership of the WTO. Most importantly of all, it must be appreciated that improved monitoring will not, in itself, deliver an improvement in 'green box' discipline. This can only be achieved if it is combined with the adoption of new criteria for the application of 'green box' exemption against which the effects of support can be measured more readily. One approach might involve the establishment of baseline criteria against which the degree to which a measure is 'distorting' can be measured. Another approach might involve limiting the amounts of permissible annual support that can be delivered through decoupled income support, or placing a time limit on its application. 154 Imposing a cap on the amount of total 'green box' support is another strategy that would target this problem. Indeed, such an approach has already been advocated by developing countries in the current WTO negotiations. 155 Any movement in this direction would spell serious problems for the Community and would be strongly resisted; and one line of defence already explored has been to seek to divide the assault by differentiating between developing countries which are major exporters of agricultural commodities and developing countries which are in clear need of greater protection under any re-negotiated URAA.
V. CONCLUSION
The URAA has been roundly criticised for the obscurity of its drafting and for its unnecessary complexity. 157 Before detailed measures for its successful reform can be agreed, 'blue box' payments should be capped at 5 per cent of the total value of agricultural production during a reference period (yet to be agreed). 159 The Community has already signalled a willingness to accept such a limitation.
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It will be apparent from the above discussion that some facets of the SFP and schemes funded under the Rural Development Regulation make them vulnerable to the argument that they fall outside the 'green box'. The stance adopted by the Community in the negotiations presupposes the retention and revision of the 'green box'. However, revising the 'green box' criteria, so as to draw a clear line between measures that are trade-distorting (or at most minimally trade-distorting) and measures that are not, will prove extremely challenging.
In this context, the 2004 Framework Document directs its focus on improved monitoring. 161 But monitoring will be of little use unless clear benchmarks and criteria are established against which measurable effects can be monitored. Possible solutions might be to apply a fixed cap to the aggregate amount of 'green box' support that is permissible and/or to clarify the fundamental requirement. A further solution might be to monitor, on an annual basis, the effect of support against published production criteria for a fixed base year. More radical solutions of this type are gaining support among developing countries within the WTO; 162 and this casts doubt on the ability of the Community to gain wider acceptance for the Mid-term
Review and for its own vision of 'green box' reform to accommodate it.
Indeed, there is growing evidence of a challenge from developing countries to the whole ethos of domestic support. With the Mid-term Review, the Community may have repackaged its direct payment regime with the clear intent of securing 'green box' compatibility under the URAA as currently constituted; and the SFP does substantially track the detailed criteria for decoupled income support. Yet, with direct payments accounting for approximately 30 billion Euros each year, the Community is faced with the compelling argument that, into whatever box such direct payments fall, the sheer volume of support cannot but influence production decisions and distort trade. 163 It is ultimately this more
